János Matuz: Energy Interests Of Poland And Hungary – Should Nord Stream 2 Be Reactivated In The Future?

In the frame of our cooperative partner’s Waclaw Felczak Institute’s financial support to Sobieski Institute, János Matuz, senior analyst presents a nuanced analysis of Poland’s and Hungary’s contrasting approaches to energy policy and Europe’s competitiveness challenges.


Poland has consistently opposed the Nord Stream pipelines, viewing them as a threat to national security, while Hungary has maintained a neutral stance, respecting Germany’s energy decisions within EU sanctions on Russia. According to Matuz, this difference reflects broader strategic priorities, with Poland favoring autonomy and Hungary emphasizing energy security.

Matuz also highlights Europe’s competitiveness crisis, exacerbated by high energy prices and slow productivity growth. Citing Mario Draghi, he notes that Europe’s energy-intensive industries are struggling, widening the economic gap with the US and China, and warns that addressing energy costs is crucial to reversing this trend.

Energy diversification remains a priority for both countries. Poland has diversified its supply with LNG and the Baltic Pipe, while Hungary, being landlocked, relies on gas interconnectors with neighboring countries and aims to expand its nuclear capacity. Both countries are also investing in renewables, although Poland relies more on solid fuels and Hungary on nuclear energy.

In conclusion, Matuz argues that the primary interests of both Poland and Hungary are (i) to expand all their energy networks and their capacities to diversify supply and to increase the security of supply; (ii) to increase the share of renewable energy sources; (iii) to develop their national energy networks; (iv) to develop their nuclear power plants. On these issues, there is a need for a regular exchange of views among decision-makers, experts and academics.

The policy paper is available at the Sobieski Institute’ website:

Bernadett Petri: Migration Policy Of The EU – Ways To Impact The EU Institutions To End The Forced Relocation Mechanism?

IIn the frame of our cooperative partner’s Waclaw Felczak Institute’s financial support to Sobieski Institute, Bernadett Petri, managing director provides an incisive analysis of the EU Migration Pact and its implications, especially for Hungary and Poland, within the broader framework of EU migration policy.

The recent Implementing Decision of the Migration Pact introduces specific quotas and calculations, which, according to Petri, impose an unfair burden on Member States like Hungary, who are most vocal in their opposition to the current EU migration policy. Poland, having also expressed strong criticism, offers Hungary a potential ally to advocate for policy revisions and to potentially form a unified V3/V4 stance on migration issues.

The Migration Pact, passed in April 2024, was intended to balance responsibility and solidarity across the EU. However, Petri notes that the new quotas—derived from border control data—disproportionately impact countries actively defending their borders. For example, Hungary and Italy are tasked with processing over half of all asylum applications under the border procedure, a burden seen as neither fair nor sustainable, particularly when other Member States have much lower quotas.

Petri emphasizes that Hungary’s interests are clear: the Migration Pact should be reconsidered to reflect the realities and interests of Member States, and countries opposing the current migration framework should be exempted. She also highlights the need for EU funding to support Hungary’s border protection efforts and calls for exemption from penalties that leverage migration as a punitive measure.

Petri concludes that Hungary’s situation, coupled with Poland’s increasing resistance to EU migration policies, creates an opportunity for these nations to push for policy changes and greater EU support for border security. With migratory pressures mounting, Petri urges for a collaborative approach, both at an EU level and within regional alliances, to secure a sustainable and fair migration strategy.

The policy paper is available at the Sobieski Institute’ website:

Viktória Lilla Pató: Hungary And Poland’s Priorities During The Presidency Of The Council Of The European Union

In the frame of our cooperative partner’s Waclaw Felczak Institute’s financial support to Sobieski Institute, Viktória Lilla Pató, leading expert provides an insightful analysis of the priorities and potential cooperation areas between Hungary and Poland during their EU Council presidencies. Both countries share regional interests but differ in focus areas, offering opportunities for complementary actions on Central and Eastern European issues.

For its 2025 presidency, Poland plans to prioritize transatlantic relations, EU enlargement, and an equitable energy transition. Hungary, presiding in 2024, focuses on bolstering European competitiveness, enhancing energy security, advancing enlargement and neighborhood policies, and strengthening EU defense capabilities. Their priorities are partly alligned, both presidencies could benefit from coordinated actions, particularly in cohesion policy reform and competitiveness initiatives that support SMEs.

In migration policy, Hungary and Poland oppose mandatory quotas and emphasize strengthening external border protection and addressing migration’s root causes. The countries could jointly advocate for enhanced EU funding for border protection and explore new solutions in asylum policies.

For EU enlargement, Poland emphasizes Ukraine and Moldova’s accession, while Hungary focuses on Western Balkan integration. Both agree that the Copenhagen criteria are essential and support a balanced approach that considers EU integration capacity.

On competitiveness, Hungary’s economic neutrality aligns with Poland’s focus on trade, critical resources, and industrial policy. The Competitiveness Pact willing to be launched under Hungary’s presidency could lay groundwork for Poland’s establishment of a Competitiveness Fund in 2025, aiming to streamline EU regulations and improve SME potential.

Energy priorities differ slightly: Poland emphasizes reducing coal-based economic burdens and modifying ETS2, while Hungary focuses on diversifying energy supplies through renewables and nuclear energy. Both presidencies, however, could support a sustainable green transition aligned with Central and Eastern European economic needs.

Pató concludes that, through collaboration, Hungary and Poland could jointly support cohesion policy reform, coordinated competitiveness efforts, migration and border protection investments, and sustainable energy policies, maximizing their presidencies to better represent regional interests.

The policy paper is available at the Sobieski Institute’ website:

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